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Decision-making is a dynamic process that begins with the accu-
mulation of evidence and ends with the adjustment of belief.
Each step is itself subject to a number of dynamic processes, such
as planning, information search and evaluation. Furthermore,
choice behavior reveals a number of challenging patterns, such
as order effects and contextual preference reversal. Research in
this field has converged toward a standard computational frame-
work for the process of evidence integration and belief updating,
based on sequential sampling models, which under some con-
ditions are equivalent to normative Bayesian theory (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007). A variety of models have been developed within
the sequential sampling framework that can account for accuracy,
response-time distributional data, and the speed-accuracy trade-
off (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Usher andMcclelland, 2001;
Brown and Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). Yet
there are differences between these models with regard to the
mechanism of decision-termination, the optimality of the deci-
sion and the temporal weighting of the evidence. There is also
a need to extend this framework to preference type of decisions
(where the criteria are up to the judge) and to enrich it so as
to include control processes (such as exploration/exploitation),
information search, and adaptation to the environment, thereby
allowing it to capture richer decision problems; for example,
when alternatives are not pre-defined, or when the decision-
maker is not just accumulating evidence but also adapting beliefs
about the data-generating process.
This Research Topic presents new work that investigates the
dynamical and mathematical properties of evidence integration
and its neural mechanisms and extends this framework to more
complex decisions, such as those that occur during risky choice,
preference formation, and belief updating. We hope these arti-
cles will encourage researchers to explore the computational
and normative aspects of the decision process and the observed
deviations. We briefly review here the contributions in this col-
lection, starting from simple perceptual decisions in which the
information flow is externally controlled to more complex deci-
sions, which allow the observer to control the information flow
and other learning strategies, and following on with preference
formation.
FAST PERCEPTUAL DECISIONS
The first group of seven articles examines issues that arise in fast
perceptual decisions that only allow the subject to control the
weighting of the incoming evidence and the termination rule.
Nevertheless, the integration time-scale, the temporal weights,
and evidence termination can vary and this strongly affects the
decision performance (how close people are to optimality) and
the fit with the data. Some of these papers also examine the neural
mechanisms that implement the decisions. In a mathematically-
oriented paper Heathcote and Love (2012) examine a variant
of a race model (the linear ballistic accumulator; LBA), which,
under certain assumptions about the underlying distributions of
starting point and drift-rate variability of evidence accumulation,
allows for closed analytical formulas for the full response-time
distribution in a lexical decision task and obtains a goodness of
fit almost as good as that of the standard LBA model. In another
formal paper, van Ravenzwaaij et al. (2012) examine, within the
standard drift-diffusion model, the optimality of evidence accu-
mulation strategies in decision situations with unequal frequency
of stimuli types. They converge on the result that a bias in the
decision starting point is optimal, in both fixed and variable dif-
ficulty conditions, though it appears that observers do not fully
follow this strategy (but see Moran and Usher, in preparation).
In another paper that examines sequential effects and decision
biases in binary choice tasks, Goldfarb et al. (2012) present a
simple extension of the standard decision model, which assumes
changes in starting point depend on stimulus repetitions and
alternations, combined with a response criteria increase following
errors. This model accounts for a rich data of sequential depen-
dence in response time and accuracy. In a paper contributed by
Tsetsos et al. (2012), the aim was to contrast the standard drift-
diffusion algorithm, which assumes that the evidence is given
temporally-uniform decision weights, and the leaky competing
accumulator model (LCA), which predicts a variety of tempo-
ral weighting patterns, including (for some model parameters)
a specific interaction between stimulus duration and temporal
weighting. While the LCA-predicted interaction was confirmed
in some of the observers (who performed multiple sessions with
the moving dots displays), future work will be needed to fur-
ther characterize how temporal weighting of evidence depends
on task characteristics and individual differences. The issue of
temporal weighting and its dependence on characteristics of evi-
dence accumulation and type of decision-boundary is further
discussed in a review paper by Zhang (2012), who also examines
how these characteristics affect decision optimality. Lastly, two
papers discuss the neural mechanisms of perceptual decisions.
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Simen (2012) examines a two-layer neural model that includes
accumulators and bistable cell-assemblies that can implement the
decision-boundary—which is assumed without much discussion
in the standard approach—and discusses the difficulties of map-
ping those processing units to the neural recordings observed in
brain data. van Vugt et al. (2012) use a model-driven approach
to reveal the EEG correlates of evidence accumulation for a
motion discrimination task. The authors use a novel computa-
tional technique to show that the time-course of the EEG activity
demonstrated a non-linear profile—a finding that may arbitrate
the dispute between linear (e.g., Brown and Heathcote, 2008)
and non-linear (e.g., Usher and Mcclelland, 2001) models of evi-
dence integration. Moreover, this paper indicates the possibility
of identifying individual differences in evidence integration (e.g.,
speed-accuracy trade-off) from the EEG signal, offering a use-
ful tool for characterizing the computational properties of the
decision mechanism.
ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKING
The second group of six articles examines decisions that extend
over a longer time-frame and which allow the subject to con-
trol the evidence accumulation process, and to form and update
beliefs about the state of the environment. The study by Knox
et al. (2011) of exploration and exploitation suggests that human
decision makers learn from interaction with their environment
in a reflective manner (without requiring direct observation of
changes in the environment) but yet do not plan optimally
because they do not consider the long-term information value
of actions. The contribution by Osman and Speekenbrink (2012)
extends this inquiry by studying how knowledge about the val-
ues of actions can be affected by tasks of prediction (outcome
estimation) and control (interventions to achieve an outcome).
They demonstrate a distinction between prediction and control
whereby controllers were able to transfer their knowledge to tests
of prediction but not vice versa. In this way, the concept of control
is similar to that of planning for a goal rather than for adapt-
ing to an environment as in Knox et al. (2011) but, in both of
these papers, decision makers cycle from evidence accumulation,
to action, to feedback, and back again (cf. model-based learning;
Sutton and Barto, 1998). Yu and Lagnado (2012) use this frame-
work in a slot machine paradigm to show that, while participants
over time came to understand the observed environment (slot
machine payouts) accurately, their understanding of the underly-
ing structure of the environment was flawed. Beliefs about struc-
ture and causality were more strongly influenced by initial beliefs
than by experience. Also studying decisions from experience, Dutt
and Gonzalez (2012) explore the role of inertia, or the tendency to
repeat one’s final decision, irrespective of its outcome. They show
both the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating inertia
into an instance-based learning model of repeated binary choice.
In contrast to this focus on inertia, Lange et al. (2012) demon-
strate how decision makers adapt to the environment, using a
new model that combines the HyGene model (Thomas et al.,
2008) with the context-activation model (Davelaar et al., 2005).
Across two experiments that manipulate serial order, consistency
of newly-acquired evidence with previously-generated hypothe-
ses, and elicitation timing, the authors show that not all data
have an equal impact on hypothesis generation processes: newly-
acquired data can cause inconsistent hypotheses to be purged
from working memory. The authors propose that whether this
results in a recency or primacy effect is likely to depend on the
richness of the information and its rate of presentation.
PREFERENCE-BASED DECISIONS
The next group of three articles addresses preference forma-
tion, in situations (risky choice and multi-attribute decisions)
that do not set up an objective/normative criterion, but rather
leaves this to the subject’s control. Fiedler and Glockner (2012)
monitor how people choose between lotteries using eye-tracking
to distinguish between competing models of risky choice. The
results disconfirmed Take-the-Best, or lexicographic heuristics,
in favor of compensatory models that assume observers inte-
grate outcomes with attentional weights determined by outcome
probability. In particular, people gather more information within
(rather than between) lotteries and they tend to gather more
information (toward the end of the decision) from the cho-
sen alternative, indicating top–down feedback from alternative
to processing representations. Also using eye-tracking, Krajbich
et al. (2012) propose a formalization of the influence of visual
fixations on the dynamics of preference formation. The authors
build on the attentional diffusion model (aDDM), which modu-
lates the rate of evidence-accumulation depending on the position
of visual fixation, to explain the responses and reaction times of
human subjects during purchasing (accept/reject) decisions. The
study demonstrates how small attentional fluctuations during
the deliberation period can influence the decision outcome. This
approach is closely related to theoretical models of multi-attribute
choice [e.g., decision field theory, Roe et al. (2001); and value-
based LCA, Usher and Mcclelland (2004)], in which attentional
switching to different choice aspects drives preference formation.
This class of models is extended in Wollschlager and Diederich
(2012), which presents a novel model of contextual preference
reversal (attraction, similarity, and compromise effects) formulti-
alternative, multi-attribute choice: the 2N-ary Choice Tree model.
The model offers closed-form expressions for choice probabilities
and response time distributions and, contrary to previous theo-
ries, explains reversal effects by assuming that attentional weights
depend on the alternatives in the choice-set [cf. a recent study,
which appeared after this Research Topic and provides an explicit
mechanism for how the alternatives affect weights to the choice
attributes: Bhatia (2013)].
NOVEL OR INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES
Finally, two papers aim to provide novel or integrative frame-
works for understanding dynamical decision making. Trueblood
and Busemeyer (2012) present a decision model based on prin-
ciples of quantum theory—a radical shift from the standard
framework—which provides a novel account of order effects in
belief updating and inference. This paper provides an introduc-
tion to the elegant principles of quantum probability. This theory
is of great potential, although stronger data might be needed
to persuade the skeptical readers (e.g., showing cyclic changes
in order effects). In the last paper Fox et al. (2013) present an
overarching framework for the entire decision making cycle, from
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the framing of a decision to establishing preferences and making
commitments. They extend the standard model to more ecolog-
ical and dynamic situations, in which the alternatives are not
predefined and the agent faces a variety of constraints and con-
flicts. The theory situates dynamical decision making with respect
to other high-level cognitive capabilities such as problem solving,
planning and collaborative decision-making.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We believe that this collection has revealed a number of impor-
tant aspects of the nature of decision processes. More importantly,
we hope that it will stimulate readers to keep probing these pro-
cesses. Various key questions are still unresolved. How close are
people to optimality when making decisions? Why does this vary
so much between the cases of evidence and preference? Is the
Bayesian framework a general one for all types of decisions (can
one extend it to more complex cases that allow the subject control
over the information flow and the decision criteria?). What are
the neural mechanisms, and the nature of individual differences?
Future research into these topics, should surely keep us stimulated
for the near future.
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